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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge: 
 
Kimberly Raso, an off-duty police officer, shot and killed 
Robert Abraham in a mall parking lot while Abraham was 
trying to escape from a Macy's store where he had been 
stealing clothes. Raso was working as a mall security guard 
at the time and testified that she fired at Abraham because 
he tried to hit her with his car after she blocked its path. 
Abraham's estate alleges that Raso used excessive force. 
According to the estate, Raso was not in front of the 
vehicle, her life was never in danger, and she fired simply 
to prevent Abraham from evading arrest. The estate points 
to physical evidence showing the bullet shattered the 
driver's side window, rather than the front windshield, and 
struck Abraham in his left arm before passing into his 
chest. 
 
Vanessa Abraham filed this suit as administratrix of 
Robert Abraham's estate, in her own right, and on behalf of 
Robert Abraham's three children. (Collectively referred to as 
"the estate.") The estate sought relief against Raso and the 
Township of Cherry Hill under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 based on 
violations of Robert Abraham's Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. 
 
                                4 
  
The complaint also included pendent state claims against 
Raso, the owners of the Cherry Hill mall that employed 
Raso, and the Macy's store where Abraham had stolen the 
clothes. 
 
Raso and her husband in turn brought negligence claims 
against Macy's, Abraham's estate, and Vanessa Abraham in 
her individual capacity and as administratrix. Raso also 
sued her own auto insurer, CNA Insurance Co., invoking an 
uninsured motorist provision in her policy. CNA then sued 
Liberty Mutual, the insurer for one of the mall defendants. 
 
The District Court held on summary judgment that 
regardless of whether Raso's use of deadly force was 
justifiable in self-defense, Abraham posed an immediate 
threat of physical harm to the public, making the shooting 
objectively reasonable. Based on this "core" holding, the 
District Court dismissed all the parties' claims, except for 
the few remaining claims not subject to a summary 
judgment motion, i.e., Raso's tort claims against Abraham's 
estate and Vanessa Abraham. 
 
We will reverse and remand for further proceedings. We 
conclude that the District Court resolved genuine factual 
disputes that, if a jury decides in favor of the estate, would 
entitle the estate to relief. Since the District Court disposed 
of all claims brought in Abraham's complaint based on the 
Court's "core" holding that Raso's use of force was 
objectively reasonable, we will vacate summary judgment 
for all of those claims, except for the dismissal of the 
estate's claim against Macy's, which we will affirm. 
 
Turning to Raso's claims, we will similarly affirm 
summary judgment in favor of Macy's for Raso's claim 
against the store, but we will reverse the dismissal of Raso's 
claim against her insurer, CNA Insurance Co. We conclude 
that under New Jersey law, Raso may be entitled to 
uninsured motorist coverage. We likewise will vacate 
summary judgment on CNA's claim against Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Co., the Cherry Hill mall's insurer. 
 
I 
 
Background 
 
On Saturday evening, October 15, 1994, Mary Jane 
Thomulka was watching Macy's security monitors when she 
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noticed Robert Abraham and his cousin, Dennis Redding, 
stealing clothes in the men's clothing department. 
Thomulka contacted Shawn Waters, another Macy's guard, 
and asked him to investigate. Waters did but decided that 
he needed help before confronting the two. Because Waters 
was concerned about having Thomulka, a woman nearfifty, 
involved if the suspects reacted violently, he specifically 
asked to have someone from the mall's security force back 
him up. Thomulka called Carmen Inverso, a security officer 
for the mall, who then put out a call to Raso and David 
Washick, the two off-duty police officers patrolling the mall. 
Raso responded that she was near Macy's while Washick, 
who was further away, headed toward Macy's. Mall guards 
Eriberto Avilez and Gary Saraceni also responded. 
According to Raso, she was told the suspects were possibly 
intoxicated. 
 
Abraham and Redding initially walked together as they 
left the mall but soon parted apparently because they 
realized they were being followed. With Raso and Avilez 
walking steadily after them, the two suspects headed 
towards Abraham's car, parked facing west in aisle 68. 
Shortly after exiting the mall, Raso and Avilez also 
separated so that they could approach the suspects from 
different directions. 
 
Abraham reached his car first and entered on the driver's 
side while Raso called out to him to stop. As Raso 
approached from the rear of the car, Avilez arrived near the 
front and tried in vain to pull Abraham from the car. With 
Avilez trying to stop Abraham, Redding fumbled at the door 
on the passenger's side of the car, but was unable to get in. 
(Redding was so intoxicated at the time that he does not 
recall the shooting.) Saraceni and Waters meanwhile were 
driving up aisle 68 in an unmarked mall pickup truck. 
 
Raso, who was in police uniform, testified that she 
repeatedly commanded Abraham to stop, but by the time 
she reached the rear driver's side of the car, he had begun 
backing. Either before or shortly after Abraham's backing, 
Avilez grabbed Redding and called out that he had him. The 
mall truck was very close at this point, withinfive or six 
feet of Abraham's car according to Saraceni, giving Saraceni 
and Waters a view of events. All witnesses agree that 
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Abraham backed out of his parking spot in an east- 
southeast direction and hit a white Ford Mustang parked in 
the opposing row of cars. 
 
Photographs of the rear of Abraham's car and the 
Mustang show that Abraham's car left a black mark 
roughly a foot long and an inch wide where his car hit the 
rear bumper of the Mustang. Abraham's car was left with a 
shorter, wider white mark on its rear bumper. Neither car's 
bumper appears in the photographs to have been dented in 
any way. 
 
Raso testified that Abraham began backing "very fast," 
forcing her to "jump out of the way." Abraham App. at 173. 
In an interview conducted by the Cherry Hill Police 
Department on October 31, 1994, roughly two weeks after 
the shooting, Raso said that Abraham backed up "in a 
reckless fashion" and she heard a "loud crash" when he hit 
the Mustang. Raso App. at 198. 
 
Waters agreed that Abraham's car struck the Mustang 
forcefully, but his testimony conflicted with the physical 
evidence and differed in a number of details from Raso's 
account. On June 26, 1997, several years after the 
incident, he testified in his deposition that: 
 
       To the best of my recollection, [Abraham's car] hit the 
       front of the parked car. I believe he did damage to the 
       front passenger side and he broke glass. I don't know 
       if it was on the car that he struck or his own vehicle. 
       And his back -- the back of his car was damaged. I 
       don't know to what extent... [It] was a severe accident. 
       He hit -- struck the car so hard he actually moved it 
       out of its spot. 
 
Abraham App. at 137-138. Waters's testimony also 
conflicted with Raso's account when he stated in his 
deposition that as Abraham began backing, Raso was"on 
the passenger side of the car towards the front of the 
vehicle." Raso App. at 468. In a statement taken the day 
after the shooting, Avilez agreed with Raso and Waters 
about how fast Abraham drove and said that Abraham"just 
floored it" in reverse and "smashed into another car." Raso 
App. at 508. 
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Because the parties dispute how much of a threat 
Abraham posed to others when he began backing, it is 
important to understand how close surrounding cars were 
and to what extent they hemmed in the officers and 
Redding. Video footage taken immediately before the 
shooting by a mall surveillance camera shows a car that 
the estate identifies as Abraham's with two open spaces on 
the driver's side and one open space on the passenger's 
side. A view of the same area just after the shooting shows 
the car is missing, leaving four empty spaces. Raso stated 
at one point in her deposition, however, that a car was 
immediately next to Abraham's car on the passenger's side 
where Redding stood. Raso App. at 438-39. At oral 
argument, the parties did not dispute the estate's account 
of where Abraham's car was parked, but following the 
arguments, counsel for one of the mall defendants 
submitted a letter questioning the location of the car. 
Although the estate's identification of the car's position 
appears compelling, for our purposes all that matters is 
that the estate has established a genuine factual dispute 
about how close other cars were. 
 
The video tape from the surveillance camera bears special 
mention. The camera shows Raso and Avilez exiting Macy's 
and follows Avilez after he separated from Raso and began 
working his way between cars up aisle 68. The tape then 
abruptly switches back inside, and filming of events outside 
resumes shortly after the shooting. According to testimony 
by Thomulka and Waters, Macy's has well over twenty 
cameras but only one or two video tapes to capture the 
various cameras' signals. Since the estate has not drawn 
any incriminating inferences from this unfortunate switch 
in the taping, we also have not. 
 
After Abraham hit the Mustang, Avilez reported that Raso 
"got in front of the car" and stood "more towards the 
center." Raso App. at 508. Avilez continued that Abraham 
"inched his vehicle towards police officer Raso" while she 
told him "to stop the car." Id. Avilez described the last 
moments before the shooting as follows: 
 
       She drawed her weapon and said, "please don't let. 
       Don't, please don't force me to do this. Please don't let 
       me do this. Stop the car." That's when he floored it, 
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       um, catching officer Raso in her left leg when um, at 
       the time she was falling she fired and discharged her 
       weapon towards the driver's side window. 
 
Id. at 509. 
 
Saraceni testified that when Raso walked in front of 
Abraham's car, she stood "[t]o the driver's side in front of 
the headlight." Abraham App. at 202. Saraceni estimated 
that Raso told Abraham to get out of his car "between eight 
and ten" times, and after the sixth or seventh time, 
according to Saraceni, she drew her weapon and said, 
"please, please don't make me do this. Just get out." Id. at 
203. Saraceni continued: "After about the fourth plea from 
officer Raso, I heard a distinct sound of Abraham's foot 
hitting the floorboards in the car, like stomping down on 
the accelerator. The car lunged forward. It didn't spin the 
wheels or anything." Id. at 204. He added: "When officer 
Raso fired the shot, everything was in motion. So she was 
moving out of the way. She was being struck at the same 
time. The car was moving forward. And the shot wasfired 
at that point." Id. at 205. 
 
Raso similarly testified in a deposition taken on July 30, 
1997 that she stood in front of the car before the shooting, 
by her account about two-and-a half feet towards the 
center of the car on the driver's side. She stated that as she 
walked closer towards the car, "he moved up maybe a foot 
or so." Id. at 174. At that point, she says she backed up, 
continuing to yell at him to stop, but Abraham moved 
forward a second time, about "six inches, a foot. I don't 
know." Id. at 176. Abraham then began"inching up, and at 
this time is when I pulled my weapon." Id.  at 180. "It was 
like - he kept inching and inching up towards me. And it 
was a standoff. And I was looking to go - and I couldn't get 
out of his way" because "[t]here were vehicles there." Id. at 
181-82. She said, "he looked right at me. And all I heard 
and saw was he slammed the accelerator to the floor. And 
I could see him go back as one would when the vehicle 
excels, [sic] and you're sitting in the driver's seat." Id. at 
183. Raso testified that she fired at Abraham because "[i]f 
I didn't, I was going to be killed." Raso App. at 442. 
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In her statement on October 31, 1994, she testified that 
she did not remember when she pulled her gun and 
recounted: 
 
       I remember just bringing the gun up and pointing it at 
       the windshield and screaming for him to stop, and 
       that's when I remember him hitting the accelerator and 
       I tried to jump out of the way, and I couldn't, and I 
       remember my left leg got caught, on the car, andfired 
       a round, into the windshield, pointing it at the 
       windshield, fired a round at the driver in order to stop 
       him. 
 
Raso App. at 199. Her testimony here is contradicted by the 
physical evidence showing that the bullet did not go 
through the front windshield, but entered from the side of 
the vehicle. 
 
The estate points out that Raso had initially testified that 
she could not remember whether she was hit by the car or 
carried by her own momentum, and later she claimed to 
recall having her leg caught by the car as she moved out of 
the way. But as the estate notes, when the mall 
surveillance video returned to the parking lot view 
immediately after the shooting, Raso is shown walking 
around without difficulty. 
 
According to the estate, Raso never stood in front of the 
car with Abraham driving toward her. Rather, Abraham 
backed out, and Raso shot him from the side as he drove 
away. In the alternative, the estate argues that even if Raso 
was at some point in front of the car, she was never in 
danger and did not fire until she was safely out of the way 
and standing along side the car. 
 
The estate notes that all of the witnesses who say Raso 
stood in front of the car and fired from that position are 
security officers working for the mall or for Macy's. These 
witnesses' testimony, the estate urges, could be rejected by 
a jury as self-serving. Relying on various pieces of physical 
evidence, the estate argues that the officers inflated the 
damage to the Mustang and hence the speed Abraham was 
driving, and the estate maintains that cars were not parked 
immediately beside Abraham's car as Raso suggested. A 
proper reading of the physical evidence, the estate argues, 
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deflates the charge that Abraham was driving recklessly 
and threatening lives. More importantly, physical evidence 
shows Raso's shot went through the driver's side window, 
not the front windshield, as Raso claimed in her statement 
on October 31, 1994. Autopsy photographs show the bullet 
struck Abraham in the back of his arm, and the medical 
examiner's report concluded, "The course of the gunshot 
wound is from left to right. In the chest it is slightly from 
front to back and slightly from above downward." Abraham 
App. at 247. 
 
The parties also refer to the testimony of two bystanders, 
Lisa Brittingham and her boyfriend, Bill Duhart, a reporter 
for a local newspaper. Brittingham and Duhart were leaving 
the mall just as Abraham and Redding walked out and 
soon found themselves in the midst of the officers' pursuit. 
Recognizing that a confrontation was about to occur, 
Duhart and Brittingham hurried inside their car and then 
watched what they could. According to Duhart, the officers 
and suspects were "approximately twenty-five to thirty-five 
yards in front of us in a couple of lanes over..." Abraham 
App. at 312. Because their view was obscured, neither 
Duhart nor Brittingham observed the shooting. When the 
police took Brittingham's statement, she was specifically 
asked, "You say you heard what sounded ah, to you like a 
gun shot. Did you see anyone fire a weapon?" She 
responded, "No." Abraham App. at 307. Duhart likewise 
was asked in a deposition, "After [Abraham's car] has 
struck [the Mustang]... what position is the police officer, 
the female officer, in at that point relative to[Abraham's] 
car, as best you can tell?" Duhart replied, "I couldn't tell. 
Primarily, she was on the driver's side rear of the car before 
it took off." Raso App. at 330. In short, Brittingham and 
Duhart have no relevant testimony about where Raso stood 
or what Abraham did after he backed up. 
 
Brittingham and Duhart do confirm what all witnesses 
agree happened after the shooting. With the mall pickup in 
pursuit, Abraham continued driving away from the scene 
for several hundred yards before finally coming to a stop. 
Officers quickly surrounded him and found he was mortally 
wounded. Abraham was pronounced dead upon arrival at 
Cooper Hospital. 
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To establish Cherry Hill's liability under Monell v. New 
York City Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 
S.Ct. 2018 (1978), the estate relied on a variety of evidence. 
Prior to the shooting, several citizen complaints had been 
filed against Raso, and the Cherry Hill Police Department 
had disciplined her for "mouthing off " at roll call, getting in 
"verbal altercations" with other officers, wearing a gym suit 
for roll call, and going to the gym when she was supposed 
to be on patrol. In early 1991 the police department, 
prompted by concerns about stress and fatigue Raso was 
experiencing, reduced her authorized hours of secondary 
employment. For a number of years, Raso had had 
problems with anxiety and depression which led her to seek 
treatment, and at the time of the shooting, she was taking 
Xanax and Prozac, two prescription drugs used to treat 
those conditions. In response to Raso's ongoing treatment, 
the police department consulted on several occasions with 
Raso's health care providers, who responded that neither 
Raso's mental health nor the drugs she was taking would 
prevent her from performing her duties. Following the 
shooting, Raso's mental health has worsened, leaving her 
unable to work. 
 
The parties initiated this action in two separate suits: (1) 
the estate's case against Raso, the Cherry Hill Township, 
and the various mall defendants, and (2) Raso and her 
husband's suit against the estate, Macy's, and Raso's 
insurer. After consolidating the two cases, the District 
Court dismissed on summary judgment all claims brought 
by the estate, as well as Raso's claims against Macy's and 
her insurers, leaving only Raso and her husband's claim 
against Abraham's estate. The parties filed notices of 
appeal, but we dismissed the appeals on July 22, 1998 for 
lack of jurisdiction, as there was no final order disposing of 
all claims. The parties returned to the District Court and 
jointly requested a final judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 
54(b). Since the estate apparently was uninsured and 
without funds, the claims remaining in the District Court, 
i.e., those brought by Raso and her husband against the 
estate, evidently were of little value absent reinstatement of 
the claims against CNA and Liberty Mutual. Consequently, 
the District Court entered a Rule 54(b) order dated August 
11, 1998. This appeal followed. 
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II 
 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291, and 
we exercise plenary review of a district court's grant of 
summary judgment. Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 
F.3d 127, 138 (3d Cir. 1998). On a motion for summary 
judgment, the court must determine whether the evidence 
shows that "there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Any factual dispute 
invoked by the nonmoving party to resist summary 
judgment must be both material in the sense of bearing on 
an essential element of the plaintiff's claim and genuine in 
the sense that a reasonable jury could find in favor of the 
nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 248-251, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-12 (1986). In opposing 
summary judgment, a party "must do more than simply 
show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material 
facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56 (1986), but a 
court should not prevent a case from reaching a jury simply 
because the court favors one of several reasonable views of 
the evidence. "[T]he judge's function is not himself to weigh 
the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to 
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." 
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. Thus, while 
the nonmoving party must present enough evidence to 
demonstrate a dispute is genuine, all inferences in 
interpreting the evidence presented by the parties should 
be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See , e.g., Boyle 
v. County of Allegheny Pa., 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 
1998). Cases that turn crucially on the credibility of 
witnesses' testimony in particular should not be resolved on 
summary judgment. Id. 
 
III 
 
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, "a plaintiff must 
allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution 
and the laws of the United States, and must show that the 
alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting 
under color of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 
108 S.Ct. 2250, 2254-55 (1988). Before we examine 
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whether Raso violated Abraham's federal rights by shooting 
him, the central issue in this case, we will first analyze the 
requirement that Raso acted under color of state law. 
 
The Supreme Court has explained, "The traditional 
definition of acting under color of state law requires that 
the defendant in a S 1983 action have exercised power 
`possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only 
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state 
law.' " West, 487 U.S. at 49, 108 S.Ct. at 2255 (quoting, 
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 
1042-43 (1941)). In Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130, 135, 
84 S.Ct. 1770, 1772-73 (1964), the Court held that a 
deputy sheriff acting as a security guard for a private park 
operator satisfied the state action requirement under the 
Fourteenth Amendment because the deputy wore a sheriff's 
badge, identified himself as a deputy sheriff while escorting 
the plaintiff off park property, and arrested the plaintiff for 
criminal trespass. As we have previously noted, conduct 
qualifying as state action under the Fourteenth Amendment 
also counts as acting under the color of state law for the 
purposes of S 1983, although the reverse is not necessarily 
true. Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 
n.15 (3d Cir. 1995)(citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 
U.S. 922, 935 n.18, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2752 n.18 (1982)). 
Based on Griffin, it is clear that even though Raso was 
working off duty as a security guard, she was acting under 
color of state law: she was wearing a police uniform, 
ordered Abraham repeatedly to stop, and sought to arrest 
him. 
 
Turning to Abraham's claim of excessive force under the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, we note that 
excessive force in the course of an arrest is properly 
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, not under 
substantive due process. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 
393-94, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1870-71 (1989). The Fourth 
Amendment provides, "The right of the people to be secure 
in their persons... against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated." To state a claim for 
excessive force as an unreasonable seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that a "seizure" 
occurred and that it was unreasonable. Brower v. County of 
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Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 1382-83 (1989). 
Abraham obviously was "seized" when shot. As the 
Supreme Court recognized in Tennessee v. Garner , 471 U.S. 
1, 7, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 1699 (1985), "there can be no 
question that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a 
seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment." The pivotal question is when the use 
of deadly force is reasonable. 
 
Deadly force will only be considered reasonable, the 
Court held in Garner, when "it is necessary to prevent 
escape and the officer has probable cause to believe that 
the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious 
physical injury to the officer or others." 471 U.S. at 3, 105 
S.Ct. at 1697. Applying this rule, Garner held 
unconstitutional a state statute that authorized officers to 
use deadly force, as the law in many states did at the time, 
against any felon fleeing or resisting arrest. The specific use 
of force challenged in Garner was a police officer's decision 
to shoot an eighth grader who had broken into an 
unoccupied house and stolen ten dollars and a purse, a 
crime that indisputably constituted a felony under state 
law. 
 
While investigating a call from a neighbor, the officer had 
walked behind the unoccupied house and spotted the 
decedent scaling a chain link fence. The officer called out to 
the decedent to stop and, when he did not, shot him in the 
back of the head. Although it was dark outside, the officer 
frankly admitted that he had no reason to believe the 
decedent was armed or dangerous and explained that his 
reason for firing was that the decedent would have escaped 
and very likely never would have been apprehended. 
 
The Supreme Court held it was unreasonable to rely on 
the technical, legal classification of the offense to determine 
when deadly force was justified. Instead, the Court required 
that deadly force must be necessary to prevent escape and 
the fleeing suspect must pose "a significant threat of death 
or serious physical injury to the officer or others." Id. at 3, 
105 S.Ct. at 1697. The Supreme Court expressly recognized 
that suspects who do not pose a significant threat and 
successfully flee may never be apprehended: "we proceed 
on the assumption that subsequent arrest is not likely." 
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471 U.S. at 9 n.8, 105 S.Ct. at 1700 n.8. But applying a 
balancing approach, the Court concluded that the 
government's interest in effective law enforcement was 
insufficient to justify killing fleeing felons who did not pose 
a significant threat of death or serious injury to anyone. 
Weighty interests militate against the unrestrained pursuit 
of arrest. As the Supreme Court explained, "The suspect's 
fundamental interest in his own life need not be elaborated 
upon. The use of deadly force also frustrates the interest of 
the individual, and of society, in judicial determination of 
guilt and punishment." 471 U.S. at 9, 105 S.Ct. at 1700. 
Echoing the concepts that defendants are entitled to the 
procedural protections of a trial, must be shown to be 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and should be punished 
according to the proportional scheme embodied in 
sentencing law, the Supreme Court emphasized, "It is not 
better that all felony suspects die than that they escape." 
Id. at 11, 105 S.Ct. at 1701. 
 
Subsequently, in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 394, 109 
S.Ct. at 1871, the Court amplified on the reasonableness 
standard applied under the Fourth Amendment while 
considering a claim that did not involve deadly force. How 
much force is permissible to effectuate an arrest, the Court 
explained, is determined based on the "totality of the 
circumstances." 
 
       Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long 
       recognized that the right to make an arrest or 
       investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right 
       to use some degree of physical coercion or threat 
       thereof to effect it. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-27, 
       88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880-83, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 
       Because "[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth 
       Amendment is not capable of precise definition or 
       mechanical application, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 
       559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1884 (1979), however, its proper 
       application requires careful attention to the facts and 
       circumstances of each particular case, including the 
       severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect 
       poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers 
       or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or 
       attempting to evade arrest by flight. See Tennessee v. 
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       Garner, 471 U.S. at 8-9, 105 S.Ct. at 1699-1700 (the 
       question is "whether the totality of the circumstances 
       justifie[s] a particular sort of... seizure"). 
 
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. at 1871-72. 
 
After explaining that reasonableness should be assessed 
in light of the "totality of the circumstances," the Supreme 
Court emphasized that the test is "whether the officers' 
action are `objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and 
circumstances confronting them, without regard to their 
underlying intent or motivations." Id. at 396, 109 S.Ct. at 
1872. 
 
Objective reasonableness, the Court made clear, has two 
important implications: First, if the shooting was not 
objectively reasonable under the circumstances, it is 
irrelevant that the officer was acting in good faith. Second, 
if the shooting was objectively reasonable, by contrast, then 
any bad faith motivating the officer would not matter for 
the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. "An officer's evil 
intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out 
of an objectively reasonable use of force." Id. at 396, 109 
S.Ct. at 1872. 
 
The Court cautioned that what force is objectively 
reasonable "must embody allowance for the fact that police 
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments -- 
in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly 
evolving -- about the amount of force that is necessary in 
a particular situation." Id. at 396, 109 S.Ct. at 1872. As 
Justice Holmes memorably said in a different context, 
"Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of 
an uplifted knife." Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 
343, 41 S.Ct. 501, 502 (1921). 
 
Combining the standards announced in Garner and 
Graham, our inquiry for the use of deadly force is as 
follows: Giving due regard to the pressures faced by the 
police, was it objectively reasonable for the officer to believe, 
in light of the totality of the circumstances, that deadly 
force was necessary to prevent the suspect's escape, and 
that the suspect posed a significant threat of death or 
serious physical injury to the officer or others? In 
determining the reasonableness of all degrees of force, the 
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Supreme Court has said that the factors to consider 
include the "severity of the crime at issue, whether the 
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the 
officer or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest 
or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Graham v. Connor, 
490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. at 1872. 
 
Because we are applying this standard on a summary 
judgment motion, we must address to what extent 
questions of "reasonableness" can be resolved on summary 
judgment. Reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment 
resembles tort law in its attention to how a specific, 
concrete circumstance should affect an officer's judgment. 
This sensitivity to context suggests that regardless of 
whether objective reasonableness invokes a different and 
heightened standard from negligence, reasonableness under 
the Fourth Amendment should frequently remain a 
question for the jury. To put the matter more directly, since 
we lack a clearly defined rule for declaring when conduct is 
unreasonable in a specific context, we rely on the 
consensus required by a jury decision to help ensure that 
the ultimate legal judgment of "reasonableness" is itself 
reasonable and widely shared. 
 
While analyzing an excessive-force claim under the 
Fourth Amendment, the Ninth Circuit has explained that 
 
       even though reasonableness traditionally is a question 
       of fact for the jury, see, e.g., White v. Pierce County, 
       797 F.2d 812, 816 (9th Cir. 1986); Akhil R. Amar, The 
       Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 
       1179 (1991), defendants can still win on summary 
       judgment if the district court concludes, after resolving 
       all factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff, that the 
       officer's use of force was objectively reasonable under 
       the circumstances. 
 
Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994). While we 
agree with this statement and find it difficult to improve 
upon, we are aware that it does not resolve the 
fundamental issue: how willing should district courts be to 
find a use of force objectively reasonable assuming a given 
set of undisputed facts? To the extent that there is a 
general answer to this question, it depends on a court 
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discerning differences in degree familiar in evaluating 
factual questions on summary judgment. As the Supreme 
Court said in Anderson, "the judge's function is not himself 
to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter 
but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." 
477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. 
 
Since the District Court relied on the risk Abraham posed 
to others in granting summary judgment, we will consider 
first whether there are genuine disputes that Abraham 
posed a "significant threat of death or serious physical 
injury" to members of the public. Finding there are such 
disputes, we turn to the alternative ground not reached by 
the District Court; namely, are there any genuine disputes 
about whether Raso's actions were justifiable in self- 
defense? On this issue, we also find summary judgment 
cannot be granted. 
 
The District Court's conclusions were premised on the 
following overview of events: 
 
       [T]his Court finds that the following material facts have 
       been established: (1) Raso was advised that Abraham 
       was intoxicated or under the influence; (2) Abraham 
       evaded apprehension by Mall security guard Roberto 
       Avilez, got into his car and disobeyed Raso's commands 
       that he not get into the car or that he exit the car; (3) 
       Abraham recklessly drove his car in reverse and at a 
       high rate of speed -- with Avilez, Redding and Raso all 
       in close proximity to the car -- out of his parking space 
       and rammed into another parked car; (4) Raso, in 
       police uniform, positioned herself towards the front of 
       Abraham's car and commanded him at least half a 
       dozen times to stop the car and get out of the car, and 
       effectively warned him that she would use her gun to 
       stop him if he kept driving at her; (5) Raso was close 
       to Abraham's car as Abraham inched his car towards 
       her and, at some point, Abraham accelerated his car 
       and drove it towards Raso; (6) Raso believed that 
       Abraham was trying to hit her or was acting with 
       reckless disregard for whether or not he hit her; and (7) 
       Raso jumped to her right out of the car's path andfired 
       her gun once at the driver-side window. 
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Abraham v. Raso, 15 F. Supp.2d 433, 444 (D.N.J. 1998). 
 
We will focus first on Abraham's conduct before he 
allegedly accelerated toward Raso because we find many 
genuine factual disputes about how much of a threat 
Abraham posed to others through that conduct. Before 
describing those disputes, however, we want to express our 
disagreement with those courts which have held that 
analysis of "reasonableness" under the Fourth Amendment 
requires excluding any evidence of events preceding the 
actual "seizure." See, e.g., Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 
1333 (8th Cir. 1993)("we scrutinize only the seizure itself, 
not the events leading to the seizure"); Carter v. Buscher, 
973 F.2d 1328, 1332 (7th Cir. 1992)("pre-seizure conduct is 
not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny."); Bella v. 
Chamberlain, 24 F.3d 1251, 1256 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting 
Bone and Carter). The District Court alluded to similar 
cases confining the reasonableness inquiry to the moment 
the officer used force. 
 
Based on these cases, we apparently should not consider 
any of the circumstances before the moment Abraham was 
actually struck by Raso's bullet because, following 
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547 
(1991), a suspect is not seized until he submits to the 
police's show of authority or the police subject him to some 
degree of physical force. Bone, Carter , and Bella might be 
understood as only excluding evidence that helps the 
plaintiff show the force was excessive, so on this more 
narrow reading, we could consider Abraham's pre-seizure 
conduct if it undermines the estate's case. But even apart 
from the problematic justification for such a distinction, 
there are considerable practical problems with trying to 
wrest from a complex series of events all and only the 
evidence that hurts the plaintiff. (What do we say about 
Abraham's inching forward before he began accelerating? 
Assuming the inching occurred, does it help him by 
showing he really did not want to hit Raso and was just 
wondering whether she would shoot when he drove past 
her, or does it show that he weighed his options and 
decided he would hit her? If the evidence can only be 
considered on the latter interpretation, should a limiting 
instruction be available upon request?) In any event, since 
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the cases purport to exclude all pre-seizure conduct and do 
not expressly draw any distinction between who the 
evidence helps, our discussion will assume the rule applies 
generally to all pre-seizure conduct. 
 
We reject the reasoning of Bone, Carter, and Bella 
because we do not see how these cases can reconcile the 
Supreme Court's rule requiring examination of the"totality 
of the circumstances" with a rigid rule that excludes all 
context and causes prior to the moment the seizure is 
finally accomplished. "Totality" is an encompassing word. It 
implies that reasonableness should be sensitive to all of the 
factors bearing on the officer's use of force. 
 
A more fundamental point is that it is far from clear what 
circumstances, if any, are left to be considered when events 
leading up to the shooting are excluded. How is the 
reasonableness of a bullet striking someone to be assessed 
if not by examining preceding events? Do you include what 
Raso saw when she squeezed the trigger? Under at least 
some interpretations of Hodari, Abraham evidently was not 
seized until after the bullet left the barrel and actually 
struck him. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 630, 111 S.Ct. at 
1552 (dissenting opinion)(suggesting that under the 
majority's analysis, there may be no seizure when the police 
shoot and miss). If we accept both this interpretation of 
Hodari as well as the rule that pre-seizure conduct is 
irrelevant, then virtually every shooting would appear 
unjustified, for we would be unable to supply any rationale 
for the officer's conduct. 
 
Courts that disregard pre-seizure conduct no doubt think 
they could avoid this problem. But even rejecting the 
rigorous interpretation of Hodari, courts are left without 
any principled way of explaining when "pre-seizure" events 
start and, consequently, will not have any defensible 
justification for why conduct prior to that chosen moment 
should be excluded. 
 
The Supreme Court has allowed events prior to a seizure 
to be considered in analyzing the reasonableness of the 
seizure. In Brower, the Court remanded for a determination 
of whether the police acted reasonably in constructing a 
roadblock used to seize a suspect in a car chase. The 
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suspect's estate alleged that the police designed the 
roadblock in a way likely to kill by placing a tractor trailer 
behind a curve and directing car headlights to blind the 
suspect as he rounded the curve. Brower, 489 U.S. at 599, 
109 S.Ct. at 1383. Under the analysis encouraged in Bone, 
Carter, and Bella, preparations predating the moment of 
seizure, i.e., the moment the car actually collided with the 
tractor trailer, must be barred from consideration. But if 
preceding conduct could not be considered, remand in 
Brower would have been pointless, for the only basis for 
saying the seizure was unreasonable was the police's pre- 
seizure planning and conduct. Hodari itself cited Brower 
but did not suggest the Supreme Court was now rejecting 
Brower's implication that pre-seizure conduct is relevant to 
the reasonableness of a seizure. 
 
We agree with the First Circuit which concluded that 
Bone, Carter, and other courts following their rule are 
mistaken and misread Hodari when they suggest the case 
supports their rule. As the First Circuit explained: 
 
       [T]he question in [Hodari] was not whether the seizure 
       was reasonable, which requires an examination of the 
       totality of the circumstances, but whether there had 
       been a seizure at all. We do not read this case as 
       forbidding courts from examining circumstances 
       leading up to a seizure, once it is established that there 
       has been a seizure. We understand Hodari to hold that 
       the Fourth Amendment does not come into play unless 
       there has been a seizure... 
 
St. Hilaire v. City of Laconia, 71 F.3d 20, 26 n.4 (1st Cir. 
1995)(emphasis in original). In sum, we think all of the 
events transpiring during the officers' pursuit of Abraham 
can be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of 
Raso's shooting. Cf. Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 173 
(4th Cir. 1994) ("The better way to assess the objective 
reasonableness of force is to view it in full context, with an 
eye toward the proportionality of the force in light of all the 
circumstances. Artificial divisions in the sequence of events 
do not aid a court's evaluation of objective 
reasonableness."). 
 
We are not saying, of course, that all preceding events 
are equally important, or even of any importance. Some 
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events may have too attenuated a connection to the officer's 
use of force. But what makes these prior events of no 
consequence are ordinary ideas of causation, not doctrine 
about when the seizure occurred. 
 
When the District Court found that Abraham posed a 
significant threat of death or serious physical injury to 
others, it emphasized the violence of Abraham's efforts to 
flee. In doing so, the District Court did not read the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the estate and failed 
to rely on the estate's version of events where there were 
genuine factual disputes. According to the District Court, 
Abraham "recklessly" drove in reverse at "a high rate of 
speed" with people in "close proximity" before he "rammed" 
into a parked car. A jury may ultimately accept this version 
of the facts, but they also may not. 
 
We begin by noting that the pursuit of Abraham in the 
parking lot appears to have been measured, not frantic. 
When the mall's surveillance video showed the actors out in 
the parking lot, they were all walking. As Avilez headed up 
aisle 68 just a short distance from where Abraham's car 
was located, he took his time, talking into a radio and 
maneuvering in between two rows of cars parked head to 
rear against each other. How frenzied this initial pursuit 
was does not necessarily show anything about Abraham's 
conduct once in his car, but it does at least suggest that 
Abraham's actions were less desperate, giving the officers 
more time for considered action and less reason to fear his 
acts. 
 
Much more significantly, when Abraham began backing, 
it is far from clear just how close Redding, Avilez, and Raso 
were and consequently whether they were put in jeopardy 
by the backing. The estate maintains, with considerable 
plausibility, that the video shows there was one open 
parking space next to Abraham's car on its passenger side 
and two open spaces to the driver's side. Testimony also 
suggests Avilez and Redding were standing near the front 
end of the car, leaving them much less exposed as 
Abraham backed away from them. Raso testified that she 
was approaching the car from the rear, leaving doubt about 
how close she was and whether Abraham really was at risk 
of hitting her as he backed. She did say in her deposition 
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taken on July 30, 1997, she had to "jump" out of the way 
when the car backed up. But in her statement taken just 
two weeks after the shooting, her description was less 
dramatic: "as the driver accelerated in reverse... I had to 
move back away from the vehicle so he didn't hit me then." 
Raso App. at 198. Raso also suggested that a car was next 
to Abraham's, making the space tight. The video tape 
evidence suggests otherwise. A reasonable jury could decide 
she embellished. 
 
How fast Abraham drove in reverse is also not beyond 
rational dispute. The District Court stated that Abraham 
"rammed" into a parked car, and it is true that witnesses 
testified that Abraham accelerated quickly out of his spot 
and collided forcefully with a Mustang parked behind him. 
But the photographs we have in the record of both 
Abraham's car and the Mustang do not show any damage 
to either car beyond smudges of paint on their bumpers. 
Based on that physical evidence, a reasonable jury could 
reject the witnesses' recollections as inaccurate. A more 
fundamental point is that given the doubts about whether 
Abraham was close to hitting someone when he backed, the 
fact that he collided forcefully with a parked car (if it is a 
fact) does not by itself show that Abraham posed a 
significant threat of death or serious physical injury to 
other people. 
 
In sum, the undisputed facts are that Abraham had 
stolen some clothing, resisted arrest, hit or bumped into a 
car, and was reasonably believed to be intoxicated. Given 
these facts, a jury could quite reasonably conclude that 
Abraham did not pose a risk of death or serious bodily 
injury to others and that Raso could not reasonably believe 
that he did. The remaining crucial fact obviously is that 
Raso and the security officers allege that Abraham tried to 
hit her with his car, or at least gave her the reasonable 
belief that he was going to hit her. 
 
Although the District Court expressly avoided finding on 
summary judgment that Raso's decision to shoot was 
justifiable in self-defense, instead relying on the risk 
Abraham posed to others, the District Court did say that 
"Raso believed that Abraham was trying to hit her or was 
acting with reckless disregard for whether or not he hit 
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her." Abraham, 15 F. Supp.2d at 444. Since at this point 
the evidence that Abraham was a threat to the public turns 
largely, if not entirely, on the threat to Raso, we turn now 
to whether a court can decide on summary judgment that 
Raso's shooting was objectively reasonable in self-defense. 
 
We disagree with the District Court that there is no 
genuine dispute that Raso was in front of the car. Although 
it is true that the security officers all testified that Raso was 
in front of the car, the fatal shot indisputably came through 
the driver's side window. The District Court emphasized 
that the autopsy report described the path of the bullet in 
Abraham's chest as "slightly from front to back and slightly 
from above downward." Abraham App. at 247. While that 
trajectory may rule out that Raso was behind the vehicle, it 
hardly precludes a jury from finding that Rasofired from 
somewhere along the front side of the vehicle and that she 
was never in front of the vehicle. The bullet indisputably 
shattered the driver's side window, struck Abrahamfirst in 
his arm, and then passed into his chest. It is true that the 
autopsy report stated that the path of the bullet was 
"slightly from front to back," but the report also was quite 
clear that "[t]he course of the gunshot wound is from left to 
right." Based on this physical evidence, a jury could 
reasonably decide to reject the security officers' testimony. 
Considering the physical evidence together with the 
inconsistencies in the officer's testimony, a jury will have to 
make credibility judgments, and credibility determinations 
should not be made on summary judgment. Boyle , 139 
F.3d at 393. 
 
As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, since the victim of 
deadly force is unable to testify, courts should be cautious 
on summary judgment to "ensure that the officer is not 
taking advantage of the fact that the witness most likely to 
contradict his story -- the person shot dead -- is unable to 
testify." Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994). 
"[T]he court may not simply accept what may be a self- 
serving account by the officer. It must also look at the 
circumstantial evidence that, if believed, would tend to 
discredit the police officer's story, and consider whether 
this evidence could convince a rational fact finder that the 
officer acted unreasonably." Id. See also Hopkins v. 
Andaya, 958 F.2d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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Even assuming there is no genuine dispute that Raso 
was in front of the car at some point, the video tape of the 
parking lot shows a wide lane between the rows of parked 
cars and open parking spaces near where Abraham backed 
out. Raso is shown walking around immediately after the 
shooting, suggesting that even if hit or brushed by the car, 
she was not significantly injured. Together with the 
questions about how fast Abraham accelerated, these facts 
raise genuine disputes about whether Raso had room to get 
out of the way. Again, the fact that Raso's shot wasfired 
through the driver's side window and hit Abraham in the 
left arm suggests she may have had time to get out of the 
way, take aim, and fire. A jury might not believe the 
officers' testimony that Raso was simultaneously in front of 
the car, being struck by it, jumping out of the way, and 
firing through the driver's side window. 
 
We want to be clear that the ultimate question is not 
whether Raso really was in danger as a matter of fact, but 
is instead whether it was objectively reasonable for her to 
believe that she was. A jury will have to determine, after 
deciding what the real risk to Raso was, what was 
objectively reasonable for an officer in Raso's position to 
believe about her safety, giving due regard to the pressures 
of the moment. After weighing the evidence, the jury may 
very well conclude that Raso had an objectively reasonable 
belief that she faced a significant threat of death or serious 
physical injury, but this is a question for the jury. In light 
of the record so far, we cannot say as a matter of law that 
it was objectively reasonable for Raso to believe that she 
was in danger. 
 
Even assuming Raso was in front of the car and was in 
danger at some point, a jury could find, notwithstanding 
her testimony, that she did not fire until it was no longer 
objectively reasonable for her to believe she was in peril. A 
passing risk to a police officer is not an ongoing license to 
kill an otherwise unthreatening suspect. See, e.g., Ellis v. 
Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243, 247 (7th Cir. 1993) ("When an 
officer faces a situation in which he could justifiably shoot, 
he does not retain the right to shoot at any time thereafter 
with impunity."). We can, of course, readily imagine 
circumstances where a fleeing suspect would have posed 
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such a dire threat to an officer, thereby demonstrating that 
the suspect posed a serious threat to others, that the officer 
could justifiably use deadly force to stop the suspect's flight 
even after the officer escaped harm's way. But in our case, 
if the jury decides that Raso did not fire until safely out of 
harm's way, the jury could also reasonably decide that 
Abraham's conduct was not so dangerous as to warrant 
Raso's use of deadly force. 
 
We find instructive the Ninth Circuit's decision in 
Hopkins, a case testing the limits of an officer's self- 
defensive use of deadly force. In Hopkins, a police officer 
responded to a call about a suspect, Stancill, who was 
creating a disturbance. Although the officer noticed Stancill 
was acting strangely, the officer made no arrest and left 
after deciding he was not "a danger to himself or others." A 
short time later, the officer observed Stancill"howling or 
braying" under a traffic light. When the officer got out of his 
patrol car, approached Stancill, and tried to frisk him, 
Stancill allegedly grabbed the officer's baton and began 
hitting him, knocking him down in the process. The officer 
claimed that as he rose from the ground, deflecting the 
blows, he fired six shots at Stancill from a range of three to 
four feet, visibly wounding him and apparently knocking 
him to the ground. Despite the officer's commands to stay 
down, Stancill continued to advance, the officer said, 
causing the two to wrestle for a minute. Breaking free, the 
officer had enough time to get away, radio for help, reload 
his weapon and cross a street. Once across the street, the 
officer said that, after warning Stancill again to stop, he 
fired four more shots at him at close range. This time the 
shots were fatal. 
 
The Ninth Circuit held that even apart from a number of 
disputes about the accuracy of the officer's story which 
precluded summary judgment, the court could not accept 
as a matter of law that the officer acted reasonably when he 
fired the final shots. Even though Stancill was attacking the 
officer, "[a]t the time of the second shooting, it was far from 
clear that [the officer] reasonably feared for his life." 
Hopkins, 958 F.2d at 887. The officer knew help was on the 
way, had a number of weapons besides his gun, could see 
that Stancill was unarmed and bleeding from multiple 
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gunshot wounds, and had a number of opportunities to 
evade him. Two of the total shots, all of which had been 
fired from a distance of four feet or less, struck Stancill in 
the head. "To endorse [the officer's] chosen course of action 
-- firing four more shots -- would be to say that a police 
officer may reasonably fire repeatedly upon an unarmed, 
wounded civilian even when alternative courses of action 
are open to him." Id. (emphasis in original) In short, the fact 
that a suspect attacked an officer, giving the officer reason 
to use deadly force, did not justify continuing to use lethal 
force. 
 
In seeking reversal, the estate has argued that Raso's use 
of force would still be unreasonable even if a jury found 
that she fired while she was in front of Abraham's car and 
in danger. According to the estate, if Raso jumped in front 
of the car to block Abraham's escape, she would have 
violated police department policy and, through that breach 
of policy, would have unreasonably created the need for 
deadly force. Because we find other grounds for reversal, we 
do not reach this issue. We note that a number of courts 
have refused to find officers liable based on their lapses in 
following police department procedures, even though those 
lapses may have contributed to the use of force. See, e.g., 
Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 779-80 (4th Cir. 1993); 
Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1275-76 (5th Cir. 
1992). By contrast, where an officer's conduct amounted to 
more than a minor departure from internal department 
policy, and in particular where the officer engaged in 
intentional misconduct, courts have found that the officer's 
acts creating the need for force are important in evaluating 
the reasonableness of the officer's eventual use of force. 
See, e.g., Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501- 
02 (11th Cir. 1985)(en banc). Similarly, in Estate of Starks 
v. Enyart, 5 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 1993), the court 
concluded that if an officer jumped in front of the 
decedent's car after the car began accelerating, the officer 
"would have unreasonably created the encounter that 
ostensibly permitted the use of deadly force." We will leave 
for another day how these cases should be reconciled. 
 
IV 
 
Raso and the estate each sued Macy's for negligence. For 
the sound reasons given by the District Court, wefind no 
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merit to these claims and, therefore, will affirm summary 
judgment for all claims against Macy's, including any 
claims by the estate for gross negligence, negligence per se, 
assault, battery, negligent hiring, and negligent supervision. 
 
The estate brought a number of other claims, including 
a S 1983 claim against the Township of Cherry Hill, 
negligence against Raso and the mall defendants (not 
including Macy's), negligent hiring and negligent 
supervision against the mall defendants, punitive damages 
against Raso and the mall defendants, and assault and 
battery against Raso and the mall defendants. Because the 
District Court's analysis of all these other claims was 
premised on the "core" holding that Raso's use of force was 
objectively reasonable as a matter of law, a holding we have 
now reversed, we will vacate summary judgment on these 
other claims and afford the District Court an opportunity to 
reassess those claims in light of our decision. 
 
In analyzing the state assault and battery claim, the 
District Court provided an extended discussion of the state 
law granting officers a privilege to commit battery. We note 
that the parties have not raised or discussed in any way 
whether state law could, for the purposes of state tort 
liability, allow officers greater immunity for using force than 
the Fourth Amendment permits. Consequently, the parties 
have not discussed whether reversing summary judgment 
on the estate's S 1983 claim necessarily implies that the 
state battery claim must also be vacated. Because the 
parties have not briefed this issue, we will not reach it. We 
will simply vacate the grant of summary judgment on the 
estate's assault and battery claims against Raso and the 
mall defendants and remand for the issue to be resolved in 
the District Court. 
 
V 
 
Both Raso and her insurer, CNA Insurance Co., filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment on whether Raso was 
entitled to uninsured motorist coverage under CNA's policy. 
Liberty Mutual, which provided a business automobile 
insurance policy to one of the Cherry Hill mall defendants, 
also filed a motion for summary judgment. Liberty Mutual 
 
                                29 
  
became involved in the case because once Raso sued CNA, 
CNA sued Liberty Mutual as a third-party defendant, 
arguing that Liberty Mutual must share in any liability CNA 
might be found to have. In Liberty Mutual's motion for 
summary judgment, it argued, as did CNA, that uninsured 
motorist coverage did not apply when Abraham's car 
allegedly struck Raso. 
 
We enter this thicket of claims to address a single, 
narrow issue: under New Jersey law governing uninsured 
motorist claims, should courts look at the tort victim's 
perspective or the tortfeasor's in deciding whether there 
was an "accident?" If a court looks to the tortfeasor's 
perspective, then assuming Abraham intended to hit Raso, 
he committed an intentional tort, making the incident no 
"accident." (Raso takes the incongruous position that even 
if the tortfeasor's perspective is used, Abraham did not 
really intend to hit her.) If the victim's perspective is used, 
on the other hand, then Raso maintains that she never 
intended for Abraham to strike her with his car, making 
any injuries she sustained an accident. 
 
While we recognize that New Jersey law leaves room for 
doubt on the issue, we predict that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court would hold that what counts as an accident 
for the purposes of uninsured motorist insurance should be 
judged from the victim's perspective. Thus, we will reverse 
summary judgment for CNA and Liberty Mutual and 
remand for further proceedings. We express no further view 
on the merits of Raso's claim against CNA or on the claim 
against Liberty Mutual. 
 
CNA's uninsured motorist provision states: 
 
       We pay damages which you or any covered person are 
       legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of 
       an uninsured motor vehicle or boat because of bodily 
       injury: 1. Sustained by you or any covered person; and 
       2. Caused by a motor vehicle or boat accident... The 
       owner's or operator's liability for these damages must 
       arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the 
       uninsured or under insured motor vehicle or boat. 
 
       "Accident" or "Occurrence" means an event or series of 
       related events resulting from continuous or repeated 
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       exposure to the same general conditions that 
       unexpectedly, unintentionally, and suddenly causes 
       bodily injury or property damage during the policy 
       period. 
 
Raso App. at 121 and 133. 
 
Under the terms of the policy, "accidents" must be 
"unexpected" and "unintentional." The difficulty, of course, 
is that the policy does not say from whose perspective 
the injury-causing events must be unexpected and 
unintentional. Contract language aside, the policy could not 
provide less uninsured motorist coverage than state law 
requires. See, e.g., Allstate Insurance Co. v. Malec, 514 A.2d 
832, 834 (N.J. 1986). Unfortunately, the state statute 
governing uninsured motorist insurance also does not 
define whose perspective should be used in determining 
what is an "accident." See N.J.S.A.S 17:28-1.1(a). And New 
Jersey courts have made conflicting statements about 
whose perspective should be used. 
 
In Continental Insurance Co. v. Miller, 654 A.2d 514 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994), a case that granted uninsured 
motorist benefits to two police officers who were 
intentionally hit by an uninsured car thief, the court 
reviewed what had been up to that point a clear line of 
cases in New Jersey supporting use of the victim's 
perspective for uninsured motorist claims. See , e.g., 
Sciascia v. American Ins. Co., 443 A.2d 1118, 1120 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982)(Fatal injuries an insured suffered 
from a drive-by shooting were "unforeseen, unusual, and 
unexpected" and hence an "accident" within the meaning of 
uninsured motorist coverage.). 
 
In Malec, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that an 
insured was not covered by automobile liability insurance 
for her own intentional, wrongful acts, but the court 
specifically distinguished personal injury protection (or PIP) 
insurance and uninsured motorist coverage. Malec , 514 
A.2d at 836. In particular, the court described one lower 
court opinion as "eminently sound" which held that for PIP 
insurance the term "accident" encompasses harm caused 
intentionally by someone other than the insured. Id. The 
court likewise noted the opinion in Sciascia and cited it for 
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the proposition that what counts as an accident for 
uninsured motorist coverage should be viewed from the 
injured insured's perspective. Id. 
 
Courts adopting the victim's perspective for uninsured 
motorist coverage have done so in part because they 
recognized that a major rationale for using the tortfeasor's 
perspective vanishes once you move from liability coverage 
to uninsured motorist coverage. Liability coverage protects 
the insured from the costs of his or her own acts, so for 
obvious reasons, the coverage typically does not extend to 
the insured's intentional wrongdoing. See, e.g., Malec, 514 
A.2d at 837-38. Thus, the rule evolved in the context of 
liability coverage that since the insured and the tortfeasor 
are one and the same person, the insured tortfeasor's 
perspective should be used for deciding when there is an 
accident triggering coverage. Uninsured motorist coverage, 
however, is different. Unlike liability coverage, it protects an 
insured from harm caused by other people's acts, and an 
insured is equally blameless and surprised regardless of 
whether the tortfeasor acted negligently or intentionally. 
Covering the insured under these circumstances does not 
encourage the insured to commit intentional, wrongful acts 
and protects the insured from unexpected losses. 
 
One natural response is that uninsured motorist 
coverage is intended to replace the coverage a tort victim 
would have if the tortfeasor actually had liability insurance. 
Since the tortfeasor's liability insurance would not pay for 
the tortfeasor's intentional acts, the argument continues, 
people are no worse off when they are denied uninsured 
motorist coverage for the intentional acts of others. The 
difficulty with this argument is that it begs the question. 
When the tortfeasor's auto insurance denies coverage 
because the insured's acts were intentional, then the tort 
victim is faced with an uninsured motorist. See N.J.S.A. 
S 17:28-1.1(e)(2)(b). At that point, the insured victim's 
argument is that the insured motorist policy was bought to 
cover unforeseen accidents caused by others who have no 
insurance coverage, and we return to our original question: 
whose perspective should be used in determining whether 
there was an accident? 
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The District Court rested its decision on dicta in 
Lindstrom v. Hanover Insurance Co., 649 A.2d 1272 (1994), 
a case which held that the victim of a drive-by shooting was 
entitled to personal-injury insurance benefits. While 
Lindstrom held that the victim's perspective should be used 
to determine what was an accident for PIP insurance, the 
court inexplicably grouped automobile liability insurance 
and uninsured motorist coverage together and declared that 
"neither... applies to injuries caused by an act that is an 
accident from the victim's perspective but that is intended 
by the actor." Lindstrom, 649 A.2d at 1276. The court 
added that Sciascia is "no longer respectable authority." Id. 
 
We believe the dicta in Lindstrom was ill-considered, 
poorly supported, and does not accurately reflect the 
position of the New Jersey Supreme Court. Consequently, 
we will not follow it. See, e.g., Travelers Indemnity Co. v. 
DiBartolo, 131 F.3d 343 (3d Cir. 1997)(adopting the position 
taken by state superior courts over ill-considered dicta by 
the state supreme court). The court in Lindstrom  made no 
mention of Malec, its earlier decision endorsing, albeit in 
dicta, the decision in Sciascia, and the court did not 
recognize that the reasons offered in Lindstrom for using 
the victim's perspective for PIP insurance apply with equal 
force to uninsured motorist coverage. Indeed, Lindstrom's 
eventual holding on PIP insurance is actually supported by 
cases such as Miller and Sciascia that adopt the victim's 
perspective where the insured is not the tortfeasor. 
 
The court apparently felt compelled to reject Sciascia 
because that case held not only that the accidents are 
determined from the victim's perspective for uninsured 
motorist coverage, but also that a drive-by shooting did not 
have a sufficient nexus with the use of an automobile to 
qualify for uninsured motorist coverage. Lindstrom, by 
contrast, held that a drive-by shooting was covered under 
PIP insurance, notwithstanding a similar requirement of a 
nexus between an automobile and the shooting. But the 
requirement of a nexus between the accident and the use 
of an automobile is a separate issue from the question of 
whose perspective should be used to determine what is an 
accident. Once this is acknowledged, it is clear that the 
court's statement in Lindstrom rejecting the victim's 
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perspective for uninsured motorist coverage not only was 
unnecessary to the outcome in Lindstrom, but was actually 
contrary to Lindstrom's own reasoning. 
 
We think it is telling that an uninsured motorist case 
decided after Lindstrom discussed the decision but did not 
follow it. See Gregory v. Allstate Insurance Co. , 716 A.2d 
573, 575-76 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1997). Gregory held 
that: 
 
       Considering the fact that the law clearly mandates a 
       liberal interpretation of the no fault statute with the 
       view to providing coverage to the victim of an accident, 
       and taking into account the clear and plain language of 
       the statute which provides coverage to persons "legally 
       entitled to recover damages of Uninsured Motor 
       Vehicles," this court is compelled to conclude that the 
       Uninsured Motorist Coverage must be afforded to 
       victims of intentional automobile collisions. 
 
Gregory, 716 A.2d at 576. As the court in Malec noted, 
"Legislation involving automobile insurance must be 
construed with `liberality in effecting the broadest 
protection of auto accident victims consistent with the 
language of the pertinent statute.' " Malec, 514 A.2d at 834 
(citation omitted). 
 
We predict that the New Jersey Supreme Court would 
adopt the tort victim's perspective for uninsured motorist 
coverage: all the uninsured-motorist cases raising the issue 
have used the victim's perspective, and legislation involving 
automobile insurance is to be interpreted broadly according 
to the New Jersey courts. Lindstrom, the one New Jersey 
Supreme Court decision rejecting the victim's perspective 
for uninsured motorist insurance, did so in dicta, without 
explanation, without addressing the substantial arguments 
made by its own lower courts for the competing position, 
and without recognizing that its dicta was deeply in tension 
with Lindstrom's own holding. A recent state decision did 
not follow Lindstrom's dicta, and finally, earlier dicta by the 
New Jersey Supreme Court in Malec, also not mentioned in 
Lindstrom, suggests the tort victim's perspective should be 
used for uninsured motorist coverage. 
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Raso raises one last argument we must address. She 
contends that the scope of coverage of her insurance 
coverage should have been submitted to an arbitrator, as 
she asserts her insurance contract requires. The issue was 
not raised before the District Court and is waived. 
 
VI 
 
In conclusion, we will affirm summary judgment granted 
in favor of Macy's for all claims brought by Raso and 
Abraham. We will reverse summary judgment granted in 
favor of Raso for the estate's S 1983 claim for excessive 
force, and we will reverse summary judgment in favor of 
CNA for Raso's claim for uninsured motorist coverage. We 
will vacate summary judgment on the following claims: (1) 
the estate's S 1983 claim against the Township of Cherry 
Hill; (2) the estate's assault and battery claims against Raso 
and the mall defendants, excluding Macy's; (3) the estate's 
claims for negligence, gross negligence, and negligence per 
se against Raso and the mall defendants, excluding Macy's; 
(4) the estate's claims for negligent supervision and 
negligent hiring against the mall defendants, again 
excluding Macy's; (5) the estate's claims for punitive 
damages against Raso and the mall defendants, not 
including Macy's; and (6) Raso's coverage under Liberty 
Mutual's policy. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of 
the District Court is reversed or vacated in part, affirmed in 
part, and remanded for further proceedings. 
 
Each party to bear its own costs. 
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